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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is understandable anxiety today that the Trump 
administration’s national-security policies are pushing the world 
trading system to the brink of collapse.1 The administration has drawn 
widespread condemnation by imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum 
in the name of national security, and it is now threatening similar 
measures with respect to automobiles.2 These measures are consistent 
 
*  Acting Assistant Professor of Lawyering, New York University School of Law. Many 
thanks to Julian Arato, Kathleen Claussen, Robert Howse, Simon Lester, participants in the 
Fordham International Law Journal symposium on International Trade, and the Journal editors. 
All opinions and errors are my own. 
1.  See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, The Trump Administration and the Future of the WTO, 44 
YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 6, 11 (2018) (contending that the Trump administration’s actions have 
“undermined the WTO’s authority as a legitimate constraint on member countries and weakened 
its influence in transnational relations”); Gregory Shaffer, A Tragedy in the Making?: The 
Decline of Law and the Return of Power in International Trade Relations, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. 
ONLINE 37, 41–42 (2018) (discussing the turn to national security measures as part of a broader 
swing back toward politics at the WTO). 
2.  See, e.g., Presidential Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11625 (Mar. 8, 2018); 
Presidential Proclamation No. 9758, 83 Fed. Reg. 25849 (June 5, 2018); Notice of Request for 
1432 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:5 
with the Trump administration’s broader governing strategy, which has 
embraced national security as a lever to obtain preferred policies on a 
range of issues from trade to immigration. It is therefore not surprising 
that much of the recent commentary on trade and security has focused 
on curbing abusive and overbroad invocations of national security by 
the executive branch.3 Other commentators, looking beyond the 
immediate threat of the Trump administration, have focused on the rise 
of China as an economic and geostrategic competitor, predicting an 
even more far-reaching transformation of the trade-security 
relationship.4 
Without diminishing either of these challenges, I argue that the 
national-security threat to the global economic order is both broader 
than the US-China trade conflict and more intractable than the Trump 
administration. Trump’s actions on trade reflect the increasing 
entanglement between national security policy and “ordinary” 
economic regulation—an entanglement that both predates and will 
outlast his administration and that extends farther than just the United 
States. This entanglement stems from a dramatic series of shifts in 
national security policy since the 1990s, such that security measures 
overlap with trade and investment rules in an ever-widening range of 
circumstances. Moreover, not all of these new security policies bear the 
hallmarks of abuse and overreach that characterize the Trump 
administration. It is unclear whether our international economic 
institutions have the legal tools, the capacity, or the legitimacy to 
address this growing body of novel—but not necessarily abusive—
national security aims. 
 
Public Comments and Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports 
of Automobiles, 83 Fed. Reg. 24735 (proposed May 24, 2018). 
3.  See, e.g., Remarks by Rachel Brewster, Symposium, International Trade, Isolationism, 
Trade Wars & Trump (Feb. 8, 2019); Jennifer A. Hillman, Trump Tariffs Threaten National 
Security, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/opinion/trump-
national-security-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/JMN2-W982]; Harold Hongju Koh, Trump v. 
Hawaii: Korematsu’s Ghost and National Security Masquerades, JUST SECURITY (June 28, 
2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/58615/trump-v-hawaii-korematsu-ghost-national-security-
masquerades/ (quoting Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)) 
(“[T]he travel ban represents only the most prominent Trump administration policy that . . . ‘now 
masquerades behind a façade of national-security concerns’”). 
4.  See, e.g., Shaffer, supra note 1, at 42–43; Anthea Roberts, Henrique Choer Moraes & 
Victor Ferguson, Geoeconomics: The Variable Relationship Between Economics and Security, 
LAWFARE (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/geoeconomics-variable-relationship-
between-economics-and-security [https://perma.cc/AE22-2ZYC]. 
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In this brief contribution, I will sketch these critical claims, which 
are defended more comprehensively in a forthcoming piece.5 Part II 
will trace the shifts in national security policy since the end of the Cold 
War. In Part III, I frame the implications of these shifts for international 
economic institutions. Part IV concludes with preliminary remarks on 
potential responses. My forthcoming work investigates further the 
normative outlook for economic law, identifying and theorizing 
possible reforms to the trade and investment system in light of these 
challenges. 
II. TRANSFORMING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
In order to understand fully the national security challenge to 
economic law, it is important at least initially to take a wider scope, 
looking beyond the current and past disputes in trade and investment 
fora.6 National security policy has expanded significantly since the 
1990s to encompass a wide range of threats, actors, and 
vulnerabilities.7 Some of these developments may appear benign, or 
even normatively desirable, while others are almost certainly troubling. 
But all of these developments have led to increasing overlap between 
security policy and ordinary regulation, to increasing conflict between 
security imperatives and individual liberties, and to demands for 
security expertise in an increasingly wide array of policymaking. The 
following discussion will illustrate these shifts by reference to 
developments in climate policy, counter-terrorism, and migration, 
before turning to their implications for economic law. 
 
5.  See J. Benton Heath, The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order, 129 
YALE L.J.  (forthcoming manuscript on file with author). 
6.  Until this year, there were no adjudicated cases on “essential security” in the seventy-
plus-year history of the GATT/WTO. For an overview of state practice under the GATT/WTO 
system, see Roger Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 697 
(2011). For discussions of cases under investment and commercial treaties, see, e.g., JOSÉ E. 
ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT 247–54 (2011). See generally Jürgen Kurtz, Adjudging the Exceptional at 
International Investment Law, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 325 (2010). 
7.  See, e.g., BARRY BUZAN, OLE WAEVER & JAAP DE WILDE, SECURITY: A NEW 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 210–12 (1998); Alexandra Gheciu & William C. Wohlforth, The 
Future of Security Studies, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 3, 3–5 
(Alexandra Gheciu & William C. Wohlforth eds. 2018); Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of 
National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 1705–51 (2011). 
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Of course, “national security” has always been a capacious and 
malleable concept.8 In legal and political theory, concepts of national 
security, vital interest, or public safety can take on a wide range of 
issues, from a narrow focus on military threats to broader concerns with 
security in all aspects of civil life.9 As soon as the term “national 
security” entered our legal lexicon with the passage of the 1947 
National Security Act,10 it was already clear to observers that the 
concept was, as one author put it, an “ambiguous political symbol.”11 
What is new, then, is not the indeterminacy of national security, 
but its conceptual explosion since the 1990s. This can be seen by 
observing changes in US national security policy over this period.12 
The first official US national security strategy, published in 1987, is 
characterized in large part by the adversarial contest between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, focusing on military threats, 
nuclear deterrence, and the balance of power.13 Contrast this with the 
2015 National Security Strategy of the Obama administration, which 
lists infectious disease, climate change, disruptions in energy markets, 
and transnational organized crime among the “top strategic risks” to 
 
8.  See, e.g., OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS 214 (2006) 
(citing, among others, United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972)). 
9.  For a particularly broad approach to public safety, see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 
222 (1651) (Oxford Univ. Press 1996). See generally Jeremy Waldron, Safety and Security, 85 
NEB. L. REV. 455 (2006): 
 
Although we know that ‘security’ is a vague and ambiguous concept, and though we 
should suspect that its vagueness is a source of danger when talk of trade-offs is in 
the air, still there has been little or no attempt in the literature of legal and political 
theory to bring any sort of clarity to the concept. 
Id. at 456. 
10.  National Security Law of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (1947). On the role 
of the Act in creating a new discourse of national security in the United States, see Aziz Rana, 
Who Decides on Security?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1417, 1451–69 (2012). 
11.  See generally Arnold Wolfers, “National Security” as an Ambiguous Political 
Symbol, LXVII POL. SCI. Q. 481 (1952). 
12.  Since 1987, the White House has periodically published a National Security Strategy, 
which is required by law to publish a “comprehensive report on the national security strategy of 
the United States,” including on US interests and objectives, foreign policy, defense capabilities, 
and proposed uses of “the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power 
of the United States” to achieve these objectives. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-433, § 603, Oct. 1, 1986, 100 Stat. 992, codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3043. 
13.  See WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 3–7 
(Jan. 1987) [hereinafter NSS 1987]. 
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the United States, alongside military attack, terrorism, and 
proliferation, with no prioritization among these disparate goals.14 
These documents admittedly reveal some continuities between 
our Cold War past and the increasingly multipolar present, but they also 
reflect some dramatic evolutions. As to continuity, both the Reagan and 
Obama strategies recognize many of the security risks that now 
preoccupy the Trump administration: they each raise concerns about 
the threats posed by international terrorism, and they each address the 
need to maintain a healthy domestic economy in the face of economic 
interdependence.15 But more recent policies reflect a much greater 
preoccupation with what Laura Donohue has referred to as “actor-less 
risks,” such as climate change and disease, along with diffuse risks 
posed by non-state actors like terrorists, transnational criminal 
organizations, and cyber-attacks.16 
This phenomenon is not limited to the United States. In 2015, 
China adopted a broad new national security law that treats security as 
a multifaceted concept with military, political, economic, 
technological, and cultural dimensions.17 In 2009, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) reported that its 
Member countries were addressing a wide range of risks in their 
security policies, including terrorism, pandemics, natural disasters, 
organized crime, cyber threats, human and drug trafficking, migration, 
and climate change.18 Another OECD working paper found that, just 
 
14.  WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2 (Feb. 2015) [hereinafter NSS 
2015]. The extent to which these grand strategy documents impact policymaking is debatable. 
See, e.g., James Goldgeier & Jeremi Suri, Revitalizing the U.S. National Security Strategy, 
WASH. Q., Winter 2016, at 35-36 (contending that the 2015 strategy reflected a lack of strategic 
focus and was largely ignored upon its release). But these documents provide a rough guide to 
the policies and measures that can, at least in principle, be justified on national-security grounds. 
15.  See NSS 1987, supra note 13, at 5 (“Economic interdependence has brought 
tremendous benefits to the United States, but also presents new policy problems which must be 
resolved.”); id. at 7 (“An additional threat, which is particularly insidious in nature and growing 
in scope, is international terrorism-a worldwide phenomenon that is becoming increasingly 
frequent, indiscriminate, and state-supported.”); NSS 2015, supra note 14, at 4 (noting dangers 
from economic interdependence); id. at 9 (“The threat of catastrophic attacks against our 
homeland by terrorists has diminished but still persists.”); WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 10, 17–24 (Dec. 2017) (discussing these two 
issues). 
16.  Donohue, supra note 7, at 1715–22. 
17.  National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, arts. 15–24 (2015), available 
at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2017-03/03/content_4774229.htm [https://perma.cc/
M2PK-3JAF].  
18.  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Security-Related 
Terms in International Investment Law and in National Security Strategies, at 11, 13 (May 
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between 2009 and 2016, the range of industries that national foreign 
investment policies treat as security-sensitive had widened 
significantly to include the protection of telecommunications, 
education, health services, and the media, among other areas.19 
While certainly troubling, the expansion of national security 
policy to encompass such a wide range of risks cannot always be 
dismissed as rank authoritarianism. For example, while there may be 
reasons to be skeptical about treating climate change as a security 
issue,20 doing so brings needed attention and resources to the regulation 
of such an overwhelming and urgent threat.21 When President Obama 
stated to The Atlantic in 2016 that climate change, and not the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”), is an existential threat to the United 
States,22 many observers could only applaud what is a refreshingly 
sober perspective. In the same vein, the Trump administration’s recent 
efforts to remove climate change from the list of security issues is 
easily criticized as yet another cynical move from an administration 
that traffics in conspiracy theories and climate denialism.23 
As national security policy has grown to encompass diffuse risks 
like climate change, it has also increasingly targeted non-state actors 
instead of state governments.24 Beginning in the 1990s and exploding 
 
2009), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/42701587.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ52-
2LEB]. 
19.  Frédéric Wehrlé & Joachim Pohl, Investment Policies Related to National Security, at 
22, OECD Working Papers on Int’l Investment 2016/02 (2016). 
20.  An excellent critical treatment of this issue, focusing on the securitization of 
environmental policy in the Clinton administration, is RITA FLOYD, SECURITY AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (2010). 
21.  Indeed, many of the efforts to redefine security at the end of the Cold War took a 
decidedly humanitarian approach, aiming to de-militarize international relations, draw attention 
to new problems like environmental degradation, and catalyze foreign aid, multilateralism, and 
other non-military solutions to global problems. See, e.g., U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME., HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, at 22–40 (1994); Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Redefining Security, 
68 FOREIGN AFF. 162 (1989); Richard H. Ullman, Redefining Security, 8 INT’L SECURITY 129 
(1983). 
22.  Jeffrey Goldberg, The Obama Doctrine, THE ATLANTIC, at 77 (April 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ 
[https://perma.cc/4X59-46TR].  
23.  See, e.g., Coral Davenport, White House Climate Panel to Include a Climate Denialist, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2019, at A1. 
24.  These two developments are not entirely unrelated. See, e.g., Philip Zelikow, The 
Transformation of National Security, THE NAT’L INTEREST, Spring 2003, at 17, 19–20 (Mar. 1, 
2003), https://nationalinterest.org/article/the-transformation-of-national-security-491 
[https://perma.cc/47TE-KN6N] (treating the Bush administration’s focus on terrorists and other 
non-state actors as being of a piece with the Clinton administration’s concerns with the security 
dimensions of public health and disease). 
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after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, national security 
policy began to shift away from state-to-state adversarial contests, and 
toward targeting individual terrorists, human rights violators, and other 
non-state actors.25 This shift is reflected in economic sanctions policy: 
whereas traditionally economic sanctions were employed in state-to-
state conflicts, states and the UN Security Council began in the 1990s 
to impose “targeted” sanctions on designated individual terrorists and 
their supporters.26 Today, the United States has declared ongoing 
national emergencies with respect to not only terrorist networks, but 
also cyber criminals and transnational criminal organizations like the 
Yakuza and MS-13, allowing the executive to freeze and block assets 
of targeted individuals.27 This individualization of national security 
raises broader concerns about due process in the face of executive 
discretion—a point that will have significant implications for the 
application of international economic law.28 
All of these concerns—the widening material scope of national 
security, its application to diffuse risks, and the potential for excess and 
deprivation of liberty—come together in the United States’ recent 
actions with respect to migration. In the Trump v. Hawaii case, five 
members of the Supreme Court deferred to the president’s assertion 
that severe restrictions on travel from several countries—restrictions 
that were designed to implement a campaign promise for a “Muslim 
 
25.  See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Targeted Warfare, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1521 (2013); Gabriella Blum, The Individualization of War, in LAW AND WAR 48 (Austin 
Sarat, Lawrence Douglas & Martha Merrill Umphrey eds. 2014). 
26.  See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & KIMBERLY ELLIOTT, 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 125–54 (3d ed. 2007); Daniel W. Drezner, Sanctions 
Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice, 13 INT’L STUD. REV. 96 (2011). 
27.  Exec. Order No. 13694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18077 (Apr. 1, 2015) (malicious cyber activities); 
Exec. Order No. 13581, 76 Fed. Reg. 44757 (July 24, 2011) (transnational criminal 
organizations); see also Specially Designated Nationals List by Program (SDN List), U.S. DEP’T 
OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/prgrmlst.txt (listing MS-13 and 
Yakuza under “TCO,” for “transnational criminal organizations”). The finding of “an unusual 
and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United 
States,” leading to a declaration of national emergency, is required by the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a). The procedure for declaring such 
emergency is provided by the National Emergencies Act. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1621–41. For an early 
recognition of the executive’s expanding powers under these statutes, see Harold Hongju Koh 
& John Choon Yoo, Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense, 26 INT’L LAW. 715, 742–46 (1992). 
28.  On the rise of due process concerns in US, EU, and UN sanctions respectively, see 
Parry S. Bechky, Sanctions and the Blurred Boundaries of International Economic Law, 83 MO. 
L. REV. 1, 30–37 (2018); Elena Chachko, Foreign Affairs in Court: Lessons from CJEU 
Targeted Sanctions Jurisprudence, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 14–18 (2019); Devika Hovell, Due 
Process in the United Nations, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 8–29 (2016). 
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ban”—were in furtherance of US national security interests.29 More 
recently, the Trump administration has declared “a border security and 
humanitarian crisis that threatens core national security interests and 
constitutes a national emergency,” in order to obtain the necessary 
funds to build a wall along the US-Mexico border.30 Both of these 
policies have rightly been criticized as manifestly motivated by racial 
and religious animus.31 
Nevertheless, the tendency to make broad and even politically 
motivated national-security claims with respect to migration is not 
limited to Trump or other authoritarian-leaning regimes. National 
security policies in other Western countries also list migration as a 
security risk,32 and the specter of migration “crises” is a constant fixture 
in headlines around the world, not just at the United States’ southern 
border.33 In 2016, as part of a broader policy realignment, the Obama 
administration declared a national emergency with respect to migration 
from Cuba, stating that “mass migration” would “endanger the security 
of the United States by posing a disturbance or threatened disturbance 
of the international relations of the United States.”34 That emergency, 
too, is ongoing.35 
 
29.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408–10, 2420–23 (2018). 
30.  Presidential Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019). The 
administration locates the authority for appropriating wall funding in 10 U.S.C. § 2808. 
31.  See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2441–45 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Declaration of Former 
U.S. Government Officials, ¶¶ 4–6 (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.vox.com/
2019/2/25/18239736/former-officials-protest-national-emergency [https://perma.cc/78HS-
R5Z6]. 
32.  See, e.g., OECD Investment Division, supra note 18, at 13 (discussing Germany’s 
security strategy). 
33.  Cf. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Migration Crises, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 609 (2017) (arguing that 
international law itself reproduces migration “crises” worldwide). 
34.  Presidential Proclamation No. 9398, 81 Fed. Reg. 9737, 9737–38 (Feb. 25, 2016). The 
authorizing statute permits the executive to make regulations governing the “anchorage or 
movement of any vessel” in US territorial waters, and to take certain other extraordinary 
measures. See 46 U.S.C. § 70051 (previously codified as 50 U.S.C. § 191). Prior to the 2016 
proclamation, the national security emergency with respect to Cuba declared under this statute 
stemmed from a 1996 shoot-down by the Cuban military of civilian aircraft in international 
airspace, resulting in the deaths of three US citizens, as well as Cuba’s support for revolutionary 
forces in Central America, among other issues. See Presidential Proclamation No. 7757, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 9515 (Feb. 26, 2004); Presidential Proclamation No. 6867, 61 Fed. Reg. 8843 (Mar. 1, 
1996). In this context, the 2016 turn to migration and away from issues like the threat and use 
of force as the basis for this emergency could be said to reflect a de-escalation of Cuba policy, 
even as it continued the preexisting and long-running national emergency. See generally, e.g., 
William M. LeoGrande, Normalizing US-Cuba Relations, 91 INT’L AFF. 473, 483–88 (2015). 
35.  Presidential Proclamation No. 9699, 83 Fed. Reg. 8161 (Feb. 22, 2018). 
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This is not to suggest a moral equivalence between the Trump 
administration and its predecessors. The migration example, in fact, 
suggests just the opposite: Obama’s 2016 proclamation was part of a 
broader realignment meant to adjust and relax a moribund Cuba policy; 
Trump’s 2017 Muslim ban was a cynical effort to deliver a hateful 
campaign promise. We can and should critique these policies on their 
merits. 
But there are legal and structural continuities, which we must 
contend with as we think about how to respond to the latest national 
security challenges. The transformation of national security to include 
a range of matters—from climate change and public health, to 
terrorism, transnational crime, human rights violations, and corruption, 
to vulnerabilities in cyberspace—creates a deep reservoir of national 
security claims, which any state may draw on in an effort to circumvent 
the ordinary rules of the road. This policy shift was happening before 
the Trump administration and even before the rise of US-China 
tensions in the past decade, and it would have continued even without 
the emergence of nationalism in the United States and abroad. But the 
increasingly tense geopolitical environment does add fuel to this fire, 
creating a greater incentive to invoke national security as a justification 
for contentious policies, as well as a reciprocal incentive for other states 
to challenge those justifications. 
III. THE COLLISION OF NATIONAL SECURITY  
AND ECONOMIC LAW 
As a result of this transformation, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to separate security issues from ordinary international 
economic law. This raises serious questions about the ability of our 
institutions to manage the boundary between security and the economy, 
either through political negotiation or judicialized dispute settlement. 
Here I will focus on just three of these questions, which roughly map 
on to the three illustrations discussed above: the challenge this 
transformation poses to the national security exceptionalism that has 
long governed trade law; the challenge to international tribunals of 
developing appropriate procedural or substantive standards for novel 
security policies; and the question of expertise and judicial review. 
Together, these challenges suggest that neither politics nor judicial 
review is sufficient to reconcile the new national security with 
international economic law. 
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By way of background, security policy is not the only thing that 
has expanded since the 1990s. Trade law has grown both substantively 
and institutionally. Substantively, trade policy concerns have shifted 
from a post-World War II focus on reducing tariff barriers and quotas, 
to a broader policy concern with “within the border” barriers to trade, 
such as regulations on health, safety, consumer protection, and the 
environment.36 Institutionally, the founding of the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) brought a robust dispute-settlement system 
capable of issuing enforceable judgments—an international trade court 
in all but name.37 International investment law underwent a similar 
transformation, as private investors began to use arbitration clauses in 
investment treaties to win binding and enforceable awards against 
national governments for expropriation or mistreatment of 
investments.38 The explosion of investor-state arbitral jurisprudence 
expanded on vague treaty terms like “fair and equitable treatment,” 
transforming them into what one author calls “an all-encompassing 
guarantee of highly flexible notions of fairness, equity, and due 
process.”39 Investment and trade treaties have even developed—albeit 
in a very limited way—rules on the admission and sojourn of aliens.40 
 
36.  See, e.g., DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? 37 (1997); MICHAEL 
TREBILCOCK, ROBERT HOWSE & ANTONIA ELIASON, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE 288–90 (4th ed. 2013). This has led to the adoption of new multilateral agreements—
such as those on technical barriers and sanitary measures—as well as the increased application 
of GATT non-discrimination disciplines to such measures. See, e.g., id. at 291–93. 
37.  See generally Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global 
Governance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9 (2016). 
38.  For an early account of this shift, see Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 
ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INV. L. J. 232 (1995). 
39.  GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 89 (2006). 
On the expansive interpretation of other treaty standards, see, e.g., Simon Batifort & J. Benton 
Heath, The New Debate on the Interpretation of MFN Clauses in Investment Treaties, 111 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 873 (2018) (critiquing the conventional wisdom that arbitral tribunals have 
reflexively applied to most-favored-nation clauses); Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global 
Fifth Amendment?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (2003) (criticizing expansive “regulatory takings” 
decisions under the NAFTA investment chapter). These standards, moreover, apply generally to 
the treatment of any “investor” or “investment”—terms that are often subject to broad and open-
ended definitions. See, e.g., Julian Arato, The Private Law Critique of International Investment 
Law, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2019) (demonstrating that investment treaties apply to a wide range 
of private rights “on a rigid, one-size-fits-all basis, without regard to the wide variation in values 
reflected in these discrete private law institutions”); Stratos Pahis, Investment Misconceived 
(forthcoming draft on file with author) (favoring a broad definition of investment). 
40.  See, e.g., ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES 121–46 (2009) (noting that many of these treaty provisions are made 
expressly subject to local immigration laws). 
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The dual growth of national security and economic law creates an 
increasing possibility for overlap, where national security measures are 
potentially in violation of economic rules. Embargoes, economic 
sanctions, and export controls are of course the classic examples.41 But 
today’s security measures, as we have seen, can include a wide range 
of regulatory efforts aimed at ensuring cybersecurity, preventing the 
spread of sensitive technologies, halting economic crises, advancing 
human rights, or even combatting climate change. All of these 
measures can—and have—come into potential conflict with trade and 
investment rules.42 
In many trade and investment agreements, any potential conflict 
between economic rules and security imperatives is supposed to be 
resolved with security exceptions. The prototypical text is Article 
XXI(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), 
which provides that nothing in the treaty shall be construed to prevent 
a state from taking “any action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests” in certain circumstances.43 
The key language in this provision is the phrase “it considers,” which 
is often interpreted to render all or part of the provision “self-
judging”—meaning that the invoking state alone may decide whether 
 
41.  For examples of such disputes, see Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, 
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Iran v. United States), Order on Iran’s Request for 
the Indication of Provisional Measures, ¶ 63 (Oct. 3, 2018) (reporting the US position that its 
sanctions on Iran are lawful under a US-Iran Treaty of Amity, because they are justified as 
“measures ‘relating to fissionable materials’ . . . or ‘necessary to protect its essential security 
interests’”); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 141–42 (June 27) (finding that a US embargo of Nicaragua had not been 
shown to be “necessary” to US “essential security interests”). 
42.  See, e.g., Remarks by Barry Appleton, Fordham International Law Journal 
Symposium: International Trade, Isolationism, Trade Wars, and Trump, (Feb. 8, 2019) 
(addressing the relationship between cybersecurity and trade treaties); José E. Alvarez, Political 
Protectionism and United States International Investment Obligations in Conflict, 30 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 117–20 (1989) (discussing potential inconsistency between U.S. investment-
screening law and its commitments under economic treaties); Anne van Aaken, International 
Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 525–26, 538 
(2009) (discussing the legality of Argentine, US, and European responses to financial crises 
under investment treaties); Ryan Goodman, Norms and National Security, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 101, 
101–05 (2001) (addressing potential conflicts between WTO rules and human rights sanctions); 
Jorge E. Viñuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law, 80 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 244 (2010) (discussing environmental measures, including their security dimensions, 
under investment law). 
43.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 
[hereinafter GATT 1947] (emphasis added). The certain circumstances include actions relating 
to nuclear materials, arms traffic, or military supplies, and actions “taken in time of war or other 
emergency in international relations.” Id. 
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the exception applies.44 This self-judging formulation is repeated in 
several other multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade and investment 
agreements.45 It is by no means ubiquitous: some treaties lack a general 
security exception altogether,46 and others use formulations that omit 
the “it considers” phrase, arguably rendering the provision 
justiciable.47 But, in general, it seems states are increasingly using self-
judging security exceptions in their investment treaties and preferential 
trade agreements.48 
This increasing preference for self-judging exceptions, however, 
is not necessarily well-suited to manage the growing scope of security 
policy.49 For years, many states have taken significant steps to avoid 
any adjudication of security-related disputes under trade treaties. In 
general, governments avoided making broad security claims in trade 
fora, and, where they did so, other states either refrained altogether 
from initiating judicial proceedings, or they have settled their disputes 
diplomatically.50 Under certain conditions, this practice of mutual self-
 
44.  See, e.g., Alford, supra note 6, at 698. For a critique of this terminology, see MITSUO 
MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 550 (3d ed. 2015). I use this well-
worn term as a convenient shorthand for treaties that use the “it considers” formulation, not as a 
judgment on whether this commonly used term is the most appropriate label. 
45.  See, e.g., U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
IN IIAS 72–96 (2009) (surveying treaty provisions). 
46.  See, e.g., Agreement for Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Sri Lanka, 
Feb. 13, 1980. 
47.  See, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of 
the BITs, 11 INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 159, 174–75 (1993) (discussing the absence of self-judging 
language in early US bilateral investment treaties, and the then-incomplete shift toward self-
judging security provisions after the 1986 Nicaragua decision); William W. Burke-White & 
Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and 
Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 307, 381–86 (2008) (arguing that security provisions in some US investment treaties 
are nonetheless “implicitly self-judging”). 
48.  Karl P. Sauvant & Mevelyn Ong, The Rise of Self-Judging Essential Security Interest 
Clauses in International Investment Agreements, COLUMBIA F.D.I. PERSP. No. 188 (Dec. 5, 
2016). 
49.  For a similar argument on “national security exceptionalism” in US trade law, see 
Remarks by Kathleen Claussen, Fordham International Law Journal Symposium: International 
Trade, Isolationism, Trade Wars, and Trump (Feb. 8, 2019). Elsewhere, see Aziz Huq, Against 
National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUPREME CT. REV. 225, 267–73 (arguing that scholars 
should recognize the continuities between national security and other domains of law, rather 
than accentuating perceived differences); Maryam Jamshidi, The Travel Ban: Part of a Broad 
National Security Exceptionalism in U.S. Law, JUST SECURITY (July 3, 2018), https://
www.justsecurity.org/58794/travel-ban-part-broad-national-security-exceptionalism-u-s-law/ 
(arguing, to the contrary, that there is an increasing and trans-substantive “judicial tendency 
since 9/11 to . . . subordinate legal norms to national security interests”). 
50.  This history is discussed in Alford, supra note 6, at 706–25. 
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restraint and diplomatic settlement can keep opportunism within 
tolerable limits, while allowing states the flexibility to address security 
imperatives. 
These conditions may be breaking down. Today, geopolitical 
rivalries are taking place within international economic institutions like 
the WTO, rather than outside of them.51 In this environment, states are 
less likely to unilaterally restrain themselves from taking security-
related measures, and they are more likely to use the judicial system to 
challenge the measures taken by their political and economic 
adversaries.52 Indeed, after two decades where mutual restraint mostly 
prevailed, the WTO dispute settlement system is now facing more than 
a dozen cases in which security exceptions may be invoked.53 As a 
result of this sudden uptick in security-related disputes, the first ever 
WTO panel decision to interpret and apply the GATT security 
exception was issued earlier this year.54 In a watershed ruling, the 
Russia—Transit panel determined that the GATT security exception is 
“not totally ‘self-judging’” and is subject to judicial review.55  This 
result is likely to catalyze further disputes under trade treaties and could 
also give comfort to private investors to challenge security-related 
measures in investor-state arbitral proceedings.56 
 
51.  See, e.g., Roberts, Choer Moraes & Ferguson, supra note 4. 
52.  For a firsthand account of the political reasons why a state might choose to challenge 
a rival’s security measures before an international court, see Paul S. Reichler, Holding America 
to Its Own Best Standards: Abe Chayes and Nicaragua in the World Court, 42 HARV. J. INT’L 
L. 15, 22–25 (2001). 
53.  These include cases challenging measures by Russia, the United Arab Emirates, 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. See George-Dian Balan, On Fissionable Cows 
and the Limits to the WTO Security Exceptions, 14 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 2, 2 & n.7 
(2019) (listing cases). In at least two earlier cases, the respondent state signaled its intent to 
invoke the self-judging security exception, and the cases were withdrawn or settled prior to any 
decision. See WTO—Dispute Settlement Body: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International 
Economic Policy and Trade of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 
15 (1998) (statement of Susan G. Esserman, General Counsel, U.S. Trade Representative) 
(explaining the US position on a EU challenge to the Helms-Burton Act); Minutes of Meeting 
Held in the Centre William Rappard on 7 April 2000, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/78, at 12–15 (May 
12, 2000) (concerning a dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua). 
54.  See Panel Report, Russia — Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS512/R (adopted Apr. 26, 2019). 
55.  Id. ¶ 7.102. This decision issued after the date of this symposium. A full examination 
of the Russia—Transit case will be included in Heath, supra note 5. 
56.  Unlike trade cases, which are state-to-state disputes, investors have no diplomatic 
incentive to restrain themselves from challenging other states’ sensitive security policies. But 
the reverse is also true: investors lack a strong financial incentive to initiate security-related 
disputes if the relevant treaty contains a self-judging security clause, because the investor faces 
low prospects of success. A decision that the GATT self-judging clause is to some extent 
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This prospect of judicial review raises further questions about the 
ability of international economic tribunals to craft workable standards 
to review national security policies. Because there is currently a dearth 
of case law under self-judging security exceptions,57 there is naturally 
a wide range of opinions on the appropriate scope and standard of 
judicial review.58 Many commentators, recognizing that the self-
judging treaty language was meant to afford a great deal of deference 
to the invoking state, focus on judicial review as a way to constrain 
obvious and flagrant abuses of national security, such as where security 
is invoked in bad faith or as a thin disguise for discriminatory 
restrictions on trade or investment.59 But, as noted above, the 
transformation of national security suggests that the more critical long-
term problem for the system may not be preventing abusive security 
claims, but managing novel ones. If that is right, then review for good 
faith, pretext, or abuse may help address some of our current crises, but 
it may not go very far toward resolving the more systemic problems. 
If tribunals go further, they will struggle to find an approach that 
provides meaningful review while still affording the level of deference 
implied by the self-judging treaty language. In this respect, the 
 
justiciable could thus embolden investors to test the limits of similar clauses in investment 
treaties. 
57.  But cf. Certain Questions of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. 
France), 2008 I.C.J. 177, 229–30 (June 4) (finding that a self-judging treaty clause in another 
context is still subject to the overarching requirement that it be applied in good faith). 
58.  Compare European Union Third Party Written Submission, Russia – Measures 
Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶¶ 38–69, DS512 (Nov. 8, 2017) (arguing that, when applying 
GATT Article XXI, a trade panel should take nine discrete analytical steps, with varying degrees 
of deference), with Third Party Oral Statement of Australia, Russia — Traffic in Transit, ¶¶ 12–
20, WTO Dispute No. DS 512 (Jan. 25, 2018) (identifying just two highly deferential stages of 
the analysis). 
59.  See, e.g., Dapo Akande & Sope Williams, International Adjudication on National 
Security Issues: What Role for the WTO?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 403 (2003) (sketching an 
approach that the authors argue “recognizes the competing considerations and will prevent 
abuse, but is nevertheless faithful to the text of the WTO Agreements”); Burke-White & von 
Staden, supra note 47, at 379 (contending that tribunals can overturn security measures where 
“evidence exists that a state uses the exception just as a pretext for ulterior economic motives, 
or where the connection between the measures taken and national security is so spurious as to 
clearly breach the good faith requirement”). This approach has also been codified in the security 
exceptions of some investment and trade treaties. See, e.g., Agreement on the Reciprocal 
Liberalisation, Promotion and Protection of Investment, Japan-Mozambique, art. 18(e), 
available at https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3114 (subjecting the 
self-judging security exception to an overarching requirement “that such measures are not 
applied by a Contracting Party in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination against the other Contracting Party, or a disguised restriction on 
investments of investors of the other Contracting Party”). 
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experience in analogous contexts is far from reassuring.60 For instance, 
the review by investor-state tribunals of Argentina’s emergency 
economic measures was widely recognized as a “frustrating” 
experience—one that lead to a series of inconsistent and contradictory 
decisions.61 Elsewhere, the judicial review of UN Security Council 
economic sanctions—which were adopted pursuant to the Security 
Council’s binding and supreme authority on matters relating to 
international peace and security—has been arguably counter-
productive, “stringing courts between the poles of inert deference and 
overreaching defiance.”62 The resulting decisions can thus tax the 
legitimacy of judicial bodies, while providing little in the way of clear 
guidance for national security policies.63 
The prospect of judicial review leads to a third question, which 
concerns the nature of expertise on security matters. One suggestion in 
the literature is that tribunals should adopt a form of procedural review, 
modeled on domestic administrative law, which would allow states to 
set their own security policies while regulating only the manner by 
which states adopt particular security measures—the inclusiveness of 
the process, the robustness of factfinding, and so on.64 This is a 
potentially useful suggestion, but it raises difficult second-order 
questions about the kind of administrative procedure we should expect 
from the expanding national security state. Already, administrative 
judgments about risk and cost-benefit analysis in the context of health, 
 
60.  There is also little guidance from the International Court of Justice, whose 
jurisprudence on treaty-based security exceptions is sporadic and often carefully confined to the 
circumstances of the case at hand. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 
141–42 (focusing on the United States’ failure to appear and justify its change in policy vis-à-
vis Nicaragua in 1985); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 182 (Nov. 6) (in a case 
involving the use of force, treating a treaty-based essential-security exception effectively as a 
renvoi to the international law of self-defense). 
61.  Sungjoon Cho & Jürgen Kurtz, Convergence and Divergence in International 
Economic Law and Politics, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 169, 190 (2018); see also Giorgio Sacerdoti, 
BIT Protections and Economic Crises, 28 ICSID REV. 351, 375–81 (2013). Even the case that 
was most deferential to the host state took an approach to the security exception that involved 
balancing the “relative importance” of the state’s security interests against its impact on 
international commerce. Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/9, Award, ¶¶ 194 (Sept. 5, 2008). It is unlikely that self-judging treaty provisions were 
designed to empower tribunals to engage in this kind of weighing and balancing. 
62.  Hovell, supra note 28, at 11. 
63.  But see Chachko, supra note 28, at 41–43 (telling a more cautiously optimistic story 
about the review of economic sanctions by the Court of Justice of the European Union). 
64.  See Stephan Schill & Robyn Briese, ‘If the State Considers’: Self-Judging Clauses in 
International Dispute Settlement, 13 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 61, 136–37 (2009) 
(suggesting an ambitious set of procedural principles). 
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safety, and environmental regulation are notoriously political, and they 
are not neatly resolved by the application of bureaucratic expertise.65 If 
and when such measures are reclassified as security issues, what types 
of expertise, process, and findings should an international tribunal 
expect? 
The problem of security expertise is reflected, in stark form, in the 
debate on Trump’s migration policy. In the days after the president’s 
border emergency declaration, two very different discourses began 
developing in opposition to the administration’s policy. One appeared 
under the headline “Can the Border Really Be Called an ‘Emergency’? 
Not According to the Dictionary.”66 This piece was explicitly the 
language of the lay public—a common-sense attitude that the ordinary 
English speaker knows what an emergency is, and the situation at the 
border does not cut it. The other was a joint statement by 58 former 
executive branch national security officials, touting their expertise, 
their high-level security clearances, and their experience having “lived 
and worked through national emergencies,” and explaining in detail 
why, in their considered judgment, there was no emergency at the US 
southern border.67 This discourse is in a sense the opposite of the first: 
Even as it also challenges the particular determinations of the Trump 
White House, the joint statement affirms the primacy of a particular 
kind of expertise—security expertise—in national-security decision 
making.68 
These discourses pull in opposite directions for international 
tribunals charged with reviewing security measures. The lay discourse 
is reflected in arguments urging tribunals to consider the ordinary 
meaning of terms like “security” and “emergency” in order to limit 
 
65.  See, e.g., TREBILCOCK, HOWSE & ELIASON, supra note 36, at 293–94 (observing that 
such issues as “scientific justification and allowable risk are difficult to arbitrate and lie at the 
heart of a country’s sovereignty”); cf. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: 
From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUPREME CT. REV. 51, 54–64 (discussing the “politicization” 
of US agency expertise in connection with climate change). 
66.  Colby Itkowitz, Can the Border Really Be Called an ‘Emergency’? Not According to 
the Dictionary, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2019) (“We could look at the law, but there’s no official 
definition of a ‘national emergency.’ So instead we’ll just turn to the dictionary.”). 
67.  Joint Statement, supra note 31, ¶¶ 1–6. 
68.  For discussions of the rise of “security” expertise, see Rana, supra note 10, at 1469–
83 (observing that “faith in security expertise” has become a defining feature of the US courts’ 
approach to “questions of threat and emergency”); Ole Waever, The History and Social 
Structure of Security Studies as a Practico-Academic Field, in SECURITY EXPERTISE 76 (Trine 
Villumsen Berling & Christian Bueger eds. 2015). 
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their scope.69 In a pair of cases dealing with identical measures adopted 
by the Indian government, two tribunals appeared to adopt something 
close to this approach, asserting without much argument that the notion 
of “essential security” must be limited to military and quasi-military 
functions.70 This decision effectively excluded from the treaties’ 
security exceptions any measures relating to natural disaster response, 
critical infrastructure, and other areas that states are increasingly 
treating as security-sensitive.71 While there may have been principled 
reasons for reaching this decision,72 this approach inevitability limits 
the ability of states to innovate when it comes to redefining their 
security interests. 
The alternative approach leads to potentially far greater deference, 
for better and worse. On this view, tribunals presume that states—and 
in particular executive branches—have unique expertise when it comes 
to defining their national interests and responding to risks and threats. 
Giving some deference on sensitive political matters like national 
security makes sense, and can contribute to greater adherence, stability, 
and legitimacy for international tribunals over the long term.73 But this 
approach has also been faulted for deferring to expertise where there is 
really no such thing: critics have charged, for example, that the 
European Court of Human Rights has been overly deferential to 
national declarations of emergency, leading to a “structural inability” 
 
69.  See, e.g., Holger P. Hestermeyer, Article XXI, in WTO—TRADE IN GOODS 569, 588 
(Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll & Holger P. Hestermeyer eds. 2010) (using a dictionary 
to explain the meaning of “emergency in international relations” in GATT Article XXI); Michael 
J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the Law of GATT: An Analysis of GATT’s Security Exception, 12 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 558, 589 (1991) (discussing and extrapolating from the ordinary meaning of 
the term “emergency”). 
70.  CC/Devas v. Republic of India, PCA Case No. 2013-09, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Merits, ¶¶ 354–56 (July 25, 2016); Deutsche Telekom AG v. Republic of India, PCA Case No. 
2014-10, Interim Award, ¶ 281 (Dec. 13, 2017). 
71.  See, e.g., CC/Devas v. India, Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, ¶ 332. 
72.  A close reading of the cases suggests that the tribunals’ reasoning was not only textual 
and instinctive, but also principled. If “essential security” in the treaties were read to encompass 
essentially any public purpose, such a reading would undercut other provisions, such as the 
requirement that any taking for a public purpose be accompanied by adequate compensation. 
See, e.g., Deutsche Telekom v. India, Interim Award, ¶ 281. This argument has significant force 
and is grounded in a structural and contextual reading of the relevant treaties. But this principled 
reading suggests only that a line must be drawn, not how to draw that line, and for that there is 
little in the awards explaining why military functions are on one side and other matters, like 
disaster response, are on the other. 
73.  See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Successful 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 314–16 (1997) (discussing the political 
sensitivity of successful international tribunals). 
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on the part of the court to police these kinds of national declarations.74 
This kind of deference to the unique fact-finding abilities of the 
executive is also reflected in Trump v. Hawaii, which is perhaps 
unwittingly ironic in the characteristics it ascribes to the Trump 
administration.75 
IV. TOWARD A RECONCILIATION? 
The overarching question is whether the evolving national 
security state and international economic law can be reconciled. As 
noted above, it is unlikely that a return to the national security 
exceptionalism of the GATT era will be manageable in the long run, 
even if that is the option states take in the short term.76 But it is equally 
unclear that we should pin our hopes on international tribunals to 
manage the increasing overlap between national security policy and 
international economic disciplines. While judicial review can 
potentially play a role in constraining abusive and pretextual security 
policies, the existing law does not effectively equip international 
adjudicators to address the proper scope of novel, but potentially good 
faith, security issues such as cyberspace and climate change. 
One potentially promising way forward is to think beyond this 
binary between self-judging provisions and judicial review. Some 
proposals already on the table suggest that national security measures 
might be effectively managed through innovative institutional designs 
that blend political, administrative, and judicial mechanisms, at both 
 
74.  GROSS & NÍ AOLÁIN, supra note 8, at 282–83. 
75.  See, for example, the Court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim: 
 
More fundamentally, plaintiffs and the dissent challenge the entry suspension based 
on their perception of its effectiveness and wisdom. They suggest that the policy is 
overbroad and does little to serve national security interests. But we cannot substitute 
our own assessment for the Executive’s predictive judgments on such matters, all of 
which “are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.” 
 
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2421–22 (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. 
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)). For a lucid argument that some legal constraints on 
presidential factfinding can be discerned even in this decision, see Shalev Roisman, Presidential 
Factfinding, 72 VAND. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2019). 
76.  See, e.g., Shaffer, supra note 1, at 49–50 (noting a proposal that would formally 
exclude certain matters, potentially including national security, from trade disputes). 
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national and international levels.77 My forthcoming work explores and 
theorizes these design options, including reforms that seek a renewed 
balance between international deliberative and judicial institutions, as 
well as complementarity between international obligations and 
domestic administrative processes. Such reforms could provide an 
appropriate balance between flexibility and constraint at a time when 
national security interests are undergoing a transformation, while also 
creating opportunities for mutual recognition and learning between 
international institutions and the national security state. 
In closing, it serves to emphasize that the problems identified here 
have both nothing and everything to do with the challenges described 
in this symposium’s title—Isolationism, Trade Wars, and Trump. I 
have argued that the most difficult national security challenges for 
international economic law come from novel and good-faith evolutions 
in security policy. The national-security actions of the Trump 
administration are not especially novel,78 and some of those actions are 
not taken in good faith. But the changes that we make to our economic 
institutions in response to today’s crises will have a profound effect on 
our ability to deal with the more systemic challenges I have described. 
This is an opportunity to think creatively about the design and purpose 
of the international economic order as we respond to the challenges of 
today and prepare for the challenges to come.79 
 
  
 
77.  For a timely example, see Remarks by Simon Lester, Fordham International Law 
Journal Symposium: International Trade, Isolationism, Trade Wars, and Trump (Feb. 8, 2019) 
(on file with author). 
78.  Compare U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS ON STEEL ON THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY 2 (Jan. 11, 2018) (finding, inter alia, that “domestic [steel] production 
capability is essential for defense requirements and critical infrastructure needs, and ultimately 
to the national security of the United States”), with KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THE FIRST 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 145 (2017) (describing US national security concerns going 
into negotiations for an International Trade Organization in 1945). 
79.  For a similar argument, see Harold Hongju Koh, Trump Change: Unilateralism and 
the “Disruption Myth” in International Trade, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. 96, 102 (2019). 
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